Department of Near Miss: Too Much Info? – Part Three

Qantas Flight 32 – Part Three

(This series begins with Part One HERE.)

Abbreviations: Captain (PIC-pilot in charge), First Officer (FO), Second Officer (SO), Check Captain (CC), Supervising Check Captain (SCC), Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor (ECAM)

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QF-32, a Qantas A-380 enroute from Singapore to Sydney, had experienced a series of "bangs" followed by indications of an engine failure and other system failures shortly after take-off.

Instead of returning immediately to Singapore the crew decided to initiate a hold at their current altitude and to take the time to sift through the ECAM messages to gain a full picture of the condition of the aircraft. They contacted Singapore ATC with a request to hold near the airport for about 30 minutes as they worked through the ECAM messages. ATC placed them in a 20 nautical mile racetrack pattern due east of the airport at 7,400 feet. Their primary concern was whether there was enough fuel on board. The assessment was that it was sufficient to achieve the objective. Singapore ATC advised them of reports of aircraft components being located on the island of Batam, which they crossed on climb-out.

While the PIC and FO began the process of accessing and acting on the various ECAM messages the SO was sent into the passenger cabin to attempt to visually observe the No. 2 engine. Once in the cabin area, a passenger who was also a company pilot, drew the SO’s attention to a tail-fin mounted camera image showing a fluid leak from the area of the left wing. The SO descended to the lower level and observed that fluid, in a stream about 18 inches wide, was flowing from the area of the No.2 engine though the turbine was not viewable from any position. He also saw damage to the left wing.

QF-32 wing damage/Thai Forum

QF-32 Turbine damage/Flightglobal.com

Back in the cockpit he reported his observations. The crew declined to attempt to further re-distribute remaining fuel because there were several ECAM messages suggesting there might be problems with the integrity of the fuel system. In addition to the known liquid leak, the ECAM was showing a fault to the aircraft’s fuel jettison feature ruling out that strategy as an option for reducing aircraft weight prior to landing.

The PIC and the SCC communicated frequently with the passengers via the public address system to keep them informed and the SCC and the SO visited the passenger cabin for the same purpose and to visually re-inspect both wings of the aircraft.

The flight crew began to think ahead to how all of the aircraft’s various degraded systems would affect a landing that would be about 100,000 lbs. over the maximum allowable landing weight. The various systems failures and the imbalances would make the approach and landing a hazardous affair. It took about 50 minutes in the racetrack pattern to go through the ECAM messages and to carefully assess the aircraft’s fly-ability. This included manual checks to confirm that the A-380 was controllable given the damage it had sustained.

Tomorrow:  Part 4 – Final Approach  (is posted HERE)

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Also on FireGeezer…

• Department of Near Miss: Too Much Info? – Part Two – August 23, 2011
• Department of Near Miss: Too Much Info? – Part Four – August 25, 2011
• Department of Near Miss: Too Much Info? – Part One – August 22, 2011
• Department of Near Miss: Too Much Info? – Conclusion – August 26, 2011