First to Tex… Good answer if you were answering any of my questions! Nicely done. I hope some of these other “Brothers” who are on the attack here read and learn. In reference to your question my answer is YES, these (4.7ppm) are TWA (Time Weighted Averages) values over an 8hr period. In ref to your second question about the pump operator my answer is NO, we are not assuming that this is okay due to being outside the TWA. That data was collected on November 7th and was from a single training fire. We are still in the process of collecting data. However, There are currently two schools of thought on a solution for HCN exposure outside in passive smoke. One solution is to establish a hot zone at every working fire and everyone in that hot zone will have SCBA on and operating. The hot zone can be a pre-established distance ie: 100′ at “every working fire” or it could be established by air monitoring which would cause one company to be designated for that purpose. The other solution deals more specifically with the pump operator position and that would be to purchase and assign a monitor to that position. When that monitor alarms at 4.7ppm, the pump operator donns and places into operation his SCBA. When it comes out of alarm, mask comes off. On a side note, there is HCN emmitted in exhaust. So we are trying to determine the source.

Single gas HCN monitor = $325.00, 34l cylinder of HCN calgas = $220.00.

And now to truckcaptain180… it is duely noted that you have not returned to this thread since the truth has been printed. Your comments are very unprofessional. I am surprised there isn’t alot of volley bashing here too! (I am a two hatter if you know what that is) Truck Captain? What kind of truck? A Silverado, Ram or F-150?

If any of you on this thread would like additional information on HCN and what our department is doing… feelfree to contact me at hcnresearch@gmail.com Let me stress… DO NOT EMAIL ME UNLESS YOU TRUELY WANT INFORMATION. I DON’T HAVE TIME FOR THE CHILDISH BS DISPLAYED HERE.

First to Tex… Good answer if you were answering any of my questions! Nicely done. I hope some of these other “Brothers” who are on the attack here read and learn. In reference to your question my answer is YES, these (4.7ppm) are TWA (Time Weighted Averages) values over an 8hr period. In ref to your second question about the pump operator my answer is NO, we are not assuming that this is okay due to being outside the TWA. That data was collected on November 7th and was from a single training fire. We are still in the process of collecting data. However, There are currently two schools of thought on a solution for HCN exposure outside in passive smoke. One solution is to establish a hot zone at every working fire and everyone in that hot zone will have SCBA on and operating. The hot zone can be a pre-established distance ie: 100′ at “every working fire” or it could be established by air monitoring which would cause one company to be designated for that purpose. The other solution deals more specifically with the pump operator position and that would be to purchase and assign a monitor to that position. When that monitor alarms at 4.7ppm, the pump operator donns and places into operation his SCBA. When it comes out of alarm, mask comes off. On a side note, there is HCN emmitted in exhaust. So we are trying to determine the source.

Single gas HCN monitor = $325.00, 34l cylinder of HCN calgas = $220.00.

And now to truckcaptain180… it is duely noted that you have not returned to this thread since the truth has been printed. Your comments are very unprofessional. I am surprised there isn’t alot of volley bashing here too! (I am a two hatter if you know what that is) Truck Captain? What kind of truck? A Silverado, Ram or F-150?

If any of you on this thread would like additional information on HCN and what our department is doing… feelfree to contact me at hcnresearch@gmail.com Let me stress… DO NOT EMAIL ME UNLESS YOU TRUELY WANT INFORMATION. I DON’T HAVE TIME FOR THE CHILDISH BS DISPLAYED HERE.

I think the WTF urge boils up in all of us from time to time. You are correct that the missing piece of information here was the involvement of new medical protocols.

I read the NIOSH reports, and then I have to find someone else who read the same report and wants to talk about it. The great thing about blogs such as this is they’ve increased and raised the amount of discourse that takes place.

I agree with the “Truth” who noted that it is easy to criticize when you don’t have to face the subject, and they can’t defend themselves. I would argue that unless people hear the voices screaming for an explanation, there is often a avoidance of facing/owning up to the issue. Much like the FOD walk on a carrier, the fire service continues to be one where the lowest ranking members insist that senior officers lead by example. Can you imagine if the banks, mortgage companies, hedge funds, etc, had been run with a similar level of internal vigilance.

I think the WTF urge boils up in all of us from time to time. You are correct that the missing piece of information here was the involvement of new medical protocols.

I read the NIOSH reports, and then I have to find someone else who read the same report and wants to talk about it. The great thing about blogs such as this is they’ve increased and raised the amount of discourse that takes place.

I agree with the “Truth” who noted that it is easy to criticize when you don’t have to face the subject, and they can’t defend themselves. I would argue that unless people hear the voices screaming for an explanation, there is often a avoidance of facing/owning up to the issue. Much like the FOD walk on a carrier, the fire service continues to be one where the lowest ranking members insist that senior officers lead by example. Can you imagine if the banks, mortgage companies, hedge funds, etc, had been run with a similar level of internal vigilance.

No, it’s not.

Failure to properly size-up an incident is a major cause of deaths, however, and most of the commenters here failed this test in their jump-to-conclusions posts here.

It raised a WTF? in my mind long before it was posted on TSL or here. As I suspected from the beginning, the problem was within some (multiple) ones having a new SOP go awry.

The poster TheTruth above largely quoted what came out on The Secret List today.

If you go back to my original post here:
> this was a situation were it **sounds to me**
>like the fairly new cyanide exposure protocols in
>Rhode Island were misapplied and/or need to be
>adjusted.

Now let’s review what was reported in the TSL today, per their conversation with the Chief:
>The ems officer in charge not being familiar with
>HCN called there medical control at the hospital
>for advice. It was determined by the ems
>personnel that all personel in any part of the
>building without scbas would be transported as a
>precaution. Not one of the firefighters that were
>transported had any complaints or even wanted to
>go but because a Doctor had gotten involved there
>was some concern as far as liability so it was >agreed that they would go.

This was a protocol problem, not a lack of SCBA problem, not a leadership problem, not an operations problem.

I do expect officers arriving on apparatus to come off with airpacks on. I don’t know in Hope Valley’s case whether they arrived on apparatus, and it’s an educated guess on my part they arrived POV.

> has been to food on the stove with smoke showing
>out 2 windows and it was 2 hotdogs. Likewise,
>I’ve been to similiar calls with barely a whisp
>of smoke but a burnt teflon pan that would choke
>out the hardest iron lunger.

Point well taken, and I probably wasn’t that articulate in my original point.

Given a sealed building in winter, of the size of this complex, it’s likely you wouldn’t have seen smoke showing from the description of the incident.

I’ve seen it with an amazing amount of fire in a similiar complex — if you looked at A, B, or D sides you wouldn’t have thought there was a fire. On C side there was sprinklers activated on three floors and the attic due to the fire spreading by autoexposure. On one side of fire doors between sections you’d be in perfectly clear air, and the other side would have smoke banked down half way to the floor.

My comments were aimed at those commenters who thought the FFs had seen fire and smoke showing and went inside without SCBA anyway. Surprises like what the two first in officers found is why I like to have SCBA on your back, but that’s not always a possibility if what works best in your district is for officers to respond direct POV and establish command and size-up the situation prior to the arrival of apparatus or higher ranking officers.

Go start reading the narratives of the NIOSH reports folks — they’re not perfect, but they’re the best we have for most incidents. You’ll find we kill more people due to bad size-up then failure to wear airpacks in a year. Now look at this thread and figure out how many people jumped to conclusions and didn’t stop and say, “Wait, this is unusual, what could be going on here?”

No, it’s not.

Failure to properly size-up an incident is a major cause of deaths, however, and most of the commenters here failed this test in their jump-to-conclusions posts here.

It raised a WTF? in my mind long before it was posted on TSL or here. As I suspected from the beginning, the problem was within some (multiple) ones having a new SOP go awry.

The poster TheTruth above largely quoted what came out on The Secret List today.

If you go back to my original post here:
> this was a situation were it **sounds to me**
>like the fairly new cyanide exposure protocols in
>Rhode Island were misapplied and/or need to be
>adjusted.

Now let’s review what was reported in the TSL today, per their conversation with the Chief:
>The ems officer in charge not being familiar with
>HCN called there medical control at the hospital
>for advice. It was determined by the ems
>personnel that all personel in any part of the
>building without scbas would be transported as a
>precaution. Not one of the firefighters that were
>transported had any complaints or even wanted to
>go but because a Doctor had gotten involved there
>was some concern as far as liability so it was >agreed that they would go.

This was a protocol problem, not a lack of SCBA problem, not a leadership problem, not an operations problem.

I do expect officers arriving on apparatus to come off with airpacks on. I don’t know in Hope Valley’s case whether they arrived on apparatus, and it’s an educated guess on my part they arrived POV.

> has been to food on the stove with smoke showing
>out 2 windows and it was 2 hotdogs. Likewise,
>I’ve been to similiar calls with barely a whisp
>of smoke but a burnt teflon pan that would choke
>out the hardest iron lunger.

Point well taken, and I probably wasn’t that articulate in my original point.

Given a sealed building in winter, of the size of this complex, it’s likely you wouldn’t have seen smoke showing from the description of the incident.

I’ve seen it with an amazing amount of fire in a similiar complex — if you looked at A, B, or D sides you wouldn’t have thought there was a fire. On C side there was sprinklers activated on three floors and the attic due to the fire spreading by autoexposure. On one side of fire doors between sections you’d be in perfectly clear air, and the other side would have smoke banked down half way to the floor.

My comments were aimed at those commenters who thought the FFs had seen fire and smoke showing and went inside without SCBA anyway. Surprises like what the two first in officers found is why I like to have SCBA on your back, but that’s not always a possibility if what works best in your district is for officers to respond direct POV and establish command and size-up the situation prior to the arrival of apparatus or higher ranking officers.

Go start reading the narratives of the NIOSH reports folks — they’re not perfect, but they’re the best we have for most incidents. You’ll find we kill more people due to bad size-up then failure to wear airpacks in a year. Now look at this thread and figure out how many people jumped to conclusions and didn’t stop and say, “Wait, this is unusual, what could be going on here?”